Bounding lemmata for non-deterministic halting times of transfinite Turing machines  by Welch, Philip D.
Theoretical Computer Science 394 (2008) 223–228
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Bounding lemmata for non-deterministic halting times of transfinite
Turing machinesI
Philip D. Welch
School of Mathematics, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TW, United Kingdom
Abstract
We use the methods of descriptive set theory and generalized recursion theory to prove various Bounding Lemmata that
contribute to a body of results on halting times of non-deterministic infinite time Turing machine computations. In particular we
observe that there is a Uniform Bounding Lemma which states that if any total algorithm halts before the first ordinal admissible
in the input x , then there is a recursive ordinal γ by which the algorithm halts on all inputs.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
We consider some queries arising from the paper [2]. These concerned various complexity pointclasses defined
using halting times of computations on the Infinite Time Turing machines of Hamkins and Kidder [3], with or without
existential ‘non-determinacy’ witnesses. The main theorems of this note are the Bounding and Uniform Bounding
Lemmata below. In particular it is the latter that answers a query from [2] and which explains various phenomena of
their paper. Briefly put, the Uniform Bounding Lemma states that if any total algorithm halts before the first ordinal
admissible in the input x , then there is a recursive ordinal γ by which the algorithm halts irrespective of x .
We shall first recall the main definitions here of the machine architecture. Later we shall use some results and
notions from admissibility theory (for which the reader may consult [1]) and from generalised recursion theory (see
[7]) and descriptive set theory (see [4]).
An infinite time Turing machine is essentially a standard Turing machine that is allowed to run for transfinite
lengths of time. It comes with a standard finite program with an additional limit state, qL , which by fiat it enters at
limit stages of time λ; a read/write head returns to the leftmost cell(s) of an infinite tape or tapes also at such times. If
we enumerate the cells of the tape(s) as Ci for i ∈ N, and if Ci has content Ci (γ ) ∈ {0, 1} at time γ , then, again by fiat,
for any limit time λ, for any i < ω Ci (λ) = lim supγ−→λ〈Ci (γ )|γ < λ〉. We have written cell(s) or tape(s) because
although the model of [3] had three infinite tapes, for input, scratch work, and output respectively, and an alphabet
consisting of just 0’s and 1’s, other, single tape, models are possible see [10]. We shall maintain however throughout
this paper the formalism of [3]. In that case the read/write head is considered as reading simultaneously one cell from
each of the three tapes. The state of the machine and its program then determine its next action depending on which
triple of 0’s and 1’s it is reading. At successor stages of time it acts simply like an ordinary Turing machine.
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As programs are finite we can consider them as enumerated 〈Pe|e ∈ ω〉 with Pe regarded as computing the e’th
ITTM function ϕe : R −→ R where we identify R with 2N. Pe thus acts on input strings x ∈ 2N; integer input is
obtained by identifying n with the string consisting of n 1’s followed by all 0’s. Like any Turing machine either Pe(x)
halts, or runs for ever – we write Pe(x) ↓ or Pe(x) ↑. We shall be concerned here mostly, but not entirely, with halting
times of such computations.
Definition 1. Pe(x) ↓α will denote that program Pe(x) ↓ in exactly α steps. Pe(x) ↓≤α, Pe(x) ↓<α are defined
analogously.
To clarify the above: Pe(x)↓α means that at ordinal time α the read/write head is in particular state qs and is reading
a triple of cells (one from each of the three tapes) so that its program determines that it goes into a halting state qh .
Thus a machine may halt exactly at some limit stage of time α where then qs = qL .
Suppose x is simple: perhaps it is an integer (i.e. it is a binary code for n ∈ N followed by an infinite string of
0’s), perhaps it is 0 (in the above sense) itself. What possible halting times as e varies are there for Pe(x)? [3] calls an
ordinal clockable if it is the halting time of a computation with input 0.
Further, let us define:
Definition 2. “Pe(x)↓ y” will denote that Pe(x)↓ and that y ∈ 2N is the contents of the output tape on halting. (Again
Pe(x)↓α y etc. are defined analogously).
Then we say that y is writable if it is the output of some program: Pe(0)↓ y. An ordinal β is writable if some
y ∈WO is writable, and y codes a well-ordering of rank β. What possible ordinals are writable? It is easy to readjust a
program that demonstrates that β is writable to one that shows that any β ′ < β is writable. Thus the writable ordinals
are an initial segment, λ, of all ordinals. Hamkins and Lewis [3] showed that there are gaps in the clockable ordinals
and the following:
Theorem 1 (Hamkins & Lewis; [3]). If β is admissible then it is not clockable.
Welch [9] shows that λ, the suprema of the writable ordinals, is also the supremum of the clockable ordinals.
One may generalise these questions to those involving arbitrary input x :
Definition 3 (Deolalikar, Hamkins, & Schindler; [2, Definition 5.18]). An ordinal α is nondeterministically clock-
able if there is an algorithm Pe which halts in time at most α for all input and in time exactly α for some input.
More generally, α is nondeterministically clockable before β if there is an algorithm that halts before β on all input
and in time exactly α for some input.
Symbolically: α is nondeterministically clockable iff
∃e ∈ N[∀x ∈ 2NPe(x)↓≤α ∧∃x ∈ 2NPe(x)↓α].
This notion arises in the paper [2], which was concerned with various complexity pointclasses defined using halting
times of computations on these machines, with or without existential ‘non-determinacy’ witnesses. The nomenclature
comes from Schindler’s paper [8]. The attempt there was made to generalise the concepts of the deterministic
polynomial time class P and the non-deterministic classNP from ordinary recursion theory to the infinite time context.
As ‘non-determinism’ in the ordinary recursion theoretic setting can be construed as an algorithm acting on a ‘guess’
one can use the same idea and define classes via machines that use ‘accept/reject’ programs to ascertain whether a
number or real x is in a class A; non-determinism then here allows some extra side information from a guess to be
used.
Definition 4 (Schindler; cf. [2]). (i) A ∈ Pα if there is β < α and there is an infinite time Turing machine deciding
each x ∈ A in fewer than β many steps.
(ii) A ∈ NPα if there is β < α and there is an infinite time Turing machine T such that x ∈ A if and only if there
is y ∈ R such that T accepts (x, y), and T halts on any input (w, z) in fewer than β steps.
Here “deciding x ∈ A in fewer than β many steps” can be taken to mean that the machine rejects or accepts in less
than β many steps. If β is a limit ordinal, then we may equivalently ask that in less than β many steps it halts with a
1 or 0 on the output tape depending on whether x is, or is not, in A. The class P is defined as Pω
ω
and NP as NPω
ω
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with the notation to be suggestive of ‘polynomial’ (although we are of the opinion that this is at most suggestive, and
we remain unconvinced that there is any analogy of substance with the classical P/NP notions). We then have:
Theorem 2 (Deolalikar, Hamkins, & Schindler; [2, Theorem 3.2]). The classes NPα for ω + 2 ≤ α ≤ ωCK1 are all
identical to the class Σ 11 of lightface analytic sets. In particular, NP = NPω+2, and so membership in any NP set
can be verified in only ω many steps. Similarly, the corresponding classes co-NPα are all identical to the Π 11 sets.
Consequently, NP ∩ co-NP is exactly the class ∆11 of hyperarithmetic sets.
Here ωCK1 is the supremum of all recursive ordinals, and ω
x
1 will be used to denote the supremum of all ordinals
recursive in x (in both cases this means recursive in the usual, ordinary sense). We see then in the last theorem how
the implicit existential quantifier over reals as guesses in the definition of NP surfaces in its classification. Clearly
P ⊆ NP ∩ co-NP, and so the last theorem (due to Schindler) then shows however that “P 6= NP”.
Theorem 3 (Deolalikar, Hamkins, & Schindler; [2, Theorems 3.1 & 5.4]). P 6= NP ∩ co-NP. In fact Pα 6= NPα ∩
co-NPα for ω + 2 ≤ α < ωCK1 . However Pα = NPα ∩ co-NPα for α = ωCK1 .
The difference in the two parts of the result above reflects the difference in α < ωCK1 being clockable, and ω
CK
1 not
being so: indeed it starts a gap of clockable ordinals of length ω: no ordinal β ∈ [ωCK1 , ωCK1 + ω) is clockable; the
next clockable is ωCK1 + ω.
We may widen the definition to allow not just constant bounds on the lengths of computations. In the following,
we say that f : R −→ On is a Turing invariant function if x , y have the same (ordinary) Turing degree, then
f (x) = f (y).
Definition 5. Let f : R −→ On be a Turing invariant function. (i) A ∈ P f if there is an infinite time Turing machine
deciding each x ∈ A in fewer than f (x) many steps.
(ii) A ∈ NP f when there is an infinite time Turing machine T such that x ∈ A if and only if there is y ∈ R such
that T accepts (x, y), and T halts on any input (x, y) in fewer than f (x) many steps.
Of particular interest is the function f0(x) = ωx1 + 1. They show:
Theorem 4. P f0 = PωCK1 .
They remark at the beginning of this section that P f0 appears at first more generous than the earlier classes, because
computations on inputs are now allowed up to ωx1 steps.
“The equality [P f0 ] = PωCK1 should be surprising, because it means that although the computations deciding
x ∈ A for A ∈ P f0 are allowed to compute up to ωx1 , in fact there is an algorithm needing uniformly fewer than
ωCK1 many steps. An affirmative answer to the following question would explain this phenomenon completely.
“Question 4.3 Suppose an algorithm halts on each input x in fewer than ωx1 steps. Then does it halt uniformly
before ωCK1 ? ”
They also note that Pω
CK
1 +1 = PωCK1 : this is prima facie also surprising since stating that A ∈ PωCK1 +1 requires only
that an algorithm determining membership in A must halt before ωCK1 , whereas for the latter class an algorithm with
uniform bound β < ωCK1 is required. The Uniform Bounding Lemma below answers Question 4.3 in the affirmative,
and the Bounding Lemma (also below) explains the second phenomenon, as well as having as a direct corollary with
the following theorem:
Theorem 5. If β is admissible then it is not nondeterministically clockable.
Besides the mentioned questions, we can make some further comments and improvements on one or two of their
other theorems. In the following we let WF (WO) denote the set of real numbers coding well-founded (respectively
well-ordered) relations. For y0 ∈WO we let ‖y0‖ ∈ On denote its ordinal rank.
Theorem 6 (Uniform Bounding Lemma). Let F : R −→ R be ITTM-computable and total as witnessed by ϕe. If
∀xϕe(x)↓<ωx1 then ∃γ < ωCK1 ∀xϕe(x)↓<γ .
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Proof. Let y be a code of a computation sequence ϕe(x)↓ witnessing that it halts. We think of such a code y as
coding a sequence of “snapshots” of the tapes’ contents etc, along an ordering coded into y; we let Field(y) be this
ordering. Then such a yx which is moreover well-founded, exists in L[x]. So let yx be the L[x]-least code for such a
well-ordered sequence. Let Φ(y, e, x) abbreviate:
“y is the L[x]-least code for a well-ordered halting computation sequence witnessing ϕe(x)↓”
Claim. Φ(y, e, x)⇐⇒ Lωx1 [x] |= Φ(y, e, x).
Proof. Note that as ϕe is total, our assumption that ϕe(x)↓<ωx1 implies, by running the algorithm Pe inside Lωx1 [x],
that the latter has the L[x]-least witness yx to Φ(y, e, x). Also notice that we cannot have for some y′ <L[x] yx that
Lωx1 [x] |= Φ(y′, e, x). This could only possibly occur if y′ coded some ill-founded computation that was merely well-
founded in Lωx1 [x], and whose well-founded part was of ordinal length ωx1 . However as yx ∈ Lωx1 [x], and ‖yx‖ < ωx1
the computation coded by y′ would have to halt at stage ‖yx‖ too. This is absurd. 
Φ(y, e, x) can be expressed as a Σ1 statement over Lωx1 [x].Moreover, again using the totality of ϕe:
¬Φ(y, e, x)⇐⇒ Lωx1 [x] |= ∃z(Φ(z, e, x) ∧ z 6= y).
Hence Φ(y, e, x) is ∆11. Hence
B = {y0|∃x∃y(Φ(y, e, x) ∧ y0 = Field(y))} ∈ Σ 11 ∩WO.
By (lightface)Σ 11 -boundedness, (see, e.g., [5] 4A.6) {‖y0‖ : y0 ∈ B} is bounded in ωCK1 . 
At the close of Section 4 of a previous version of their paper there was some speculation that one might have
in general that NP f = Γ˘ f , the dual class of Γ f . (Note that this is indeed true for the case of f (x) = ωCK1 : here
NP f = Σ 11 = Γ˘ f .) We gave a counterexample to this which is the Lemma that follows, wherein P f equals ∆(Γ f ).
The point here is to ask the question “where does the existential witness y to x being in some NP f set live?”
Call f : R→ On suitable if x ≤T y → ω+ 1 ≤ f (x) ≤ f (y). Let f be suitable such that L f (x)[x] |= KPI (KPI
is the theory asserting that the universe is an admissible set which is a union of such.) Let:
Γ f = {A ⊆ R : ∃Σ1ϕ∀x[x ∈ A←→ L f (x)[x] |= ϕ[x] ]}.
Lemma 7. (i) NP f ⊆ Γ f (and hence P f ⊆ NP f ∩ co-NP f ⊆ Γ f ∩ co-Γ f ). Hence in general for such f ,
NP f 6= Γ˘ f .
(ii) If additionally f satisfies ∀x f (x) ≤ Σ x then P f = NP f ∩ co-NP f = Γ f ∩ co-Γ f .
Proof. Assume that NP f ⊆ Γ f is proven. That P f ⊆ NP f ∩ co-NP f ⊆ Γ f ∩ co-Γ f is straightforward. If f is
chosen so that Γ f is not self-dual, the final sentence then trivially follows. (Examples of such f are easily found: let
f (x) be the least µ so that M = Lµ[x] is an admissible limit of admissibles; then ρ1M = ω and thus M’s Σ1 truth set
is not in M , and so provides an example of a set in Γ f \Γ˘ f .)
For the proof that NP f ⊆ Γ f , let ϕe be such that ∀x, yϕe(x, y)↓< f (x) and A = {x : ∃y ϕe(x, y)↓ 1}. So where
can we find such a witnessing y if x is in A?
Suppose x ∈ A and y witnesses this. Suppose ϕe(x, y)↓γ 1 with γ < f (x). Let uγ ∈ Mx =df L f (x)[x],
uγ ∈WO, with ‖uγ ‖ = γ . Let
B = {y : ∃z(zcodes a well-founded computation sequence witnessing ϕe(x, y)↓‖uγ ‖ 1)}
B 6= ∅, and B ∈ Σ 11 (x, uγ ). The Kleene Basis Theorem (relativised to x, uγ ) then states that ∃y0 ∈ B y0 ≤T Ox,uγ
(see, e.g., [7, Theorem III.1.3];O here is Kleene’sO notation.) However then there is such a y0 ∈Mx , asOx,uγ ∈Mx
by our KPI assumption (recall that Ox,uγ is Σ1-definable over the least admissible set containing x, uγ ). So now
∀x[x ∈ A⇐⇒Mx |= “ ∃y0ϕe(x, y0)↓ 1”]
and this yields a defining Σ1 formula for A, putting A into Γ f . This concludes the proof of (i). Now assume
f is as in (ii). Suppose A ∈ Γ f ∩ co-Γ f . We show that A ∈ P f . As A ∈ Γ f there is a Σ1 ϕ so that
∀x[x ∈ A←→ L f (x)[x] |= ϕ[x] ].
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Let Pe be the program that searches for a code of some Lα[x] that witnesses that ϕ[x] holds, and halts with
output 1 if it finds such. Since f (x) ≤ Σ x it can look for codes of such Lα[x] for any α < Σ x . Then
∀x[x ∈ A ←→ Pe(x) ↓ 1]. However we also have that A ∈ co-Γ f . So there is another program Pe′ that similarly
searches for witnesses to the fact that x /∈ A: thus we have ∀x[x /∈ A ←→ Pe′(x) ↓ 1]. So let e′′ be the index of a
program simulating these two programs together, looking for the first to halt, etc. This will halt before f (x). Hence
A ∈ P f . 
We can get another Bounding Lemma:
Theorem 8 (Bounding Lemma). Suppose β be admissible. Let F be ITTM-computable, and total so that ∀xϕe(x)↓≤β
where ϕe computes F. Then ∃γ < β ∀xϕe(x)↓<γ .
Proof. Suppose the theorem is false as witnessed by the total function ϕ = ϕe. Then β is obviously countable. By a
theorem of Harvey Friedman and Ronald Jensen any countable admissible β is ωr1 for some r ⊆ ω (cf.[6]). Let T be
the following theory consisting of the following sets of sentences in the language L∈,r˙ augmented by a new constant
c:
(i) KP+ r˙ ⊆ ω;
(ii) the ∈-diagram of 〈Lβ [r ],∈〉 ;
(iii) “∀x[x ∈ y˙ −→∨z∈y x = z˙]” for all y ∈ Lβ [r ].
(iv) “γ ∈ c∧c is an ordinal” for all γ < β.
(v) “∀a ≤ c(La[r˙ ] 6|= KP)”
(vi) “∃x∃ f [ f maps c order preserving into Field(y) where y codes a halted course of computation of the form ϕ(x)↓.”
Claim. If T0 ⊆ T, T0 ∈ Lβ [r ], then T0 has a model.
Proof. Let δ < β be the least ordinal not “mentioned” in T0. Find a (well-founded) KP model N , with r ∈ N , and
with an x ∈ N , with OnN > δ, and so that N |= ¬ϕ(x)↓≤δ . Then ∃ f ∈ N with f : δ −→ Field(y) where y ∈ N
codes the course of computation. Let δ interpret c. 
By the Barwise Compactness Theorem T has a modelM. By (i)–(iii) this is a KP model whose L[r ]-part end-
extends Lβ [r ], and moreover wfp(M) ∩ On = β (by virtue of (v)). Let x0 ∈ M witness (vi). Then we shall have
that for every δ < β,M |=“¬ϕ(x0)↓<δ”. However in V we have then that ϕ(x0)↓β . Moreover note that β is x0-
admissible (otherwise we could Σ1-define insideM, β from x0 and ordinal parameters less than β). However we have
just argued that β is x0-clockable! This contradicts Theorem 1 above. 
Hence in the terminology of [2] “Pβ = Pβ+1” and “NPβ = NPβ+1” so this shows that the requirement on β not
being a limit of non-clockables can be lifted from their [2, Theorem 5.10].
In [2, Section 6] they consider the P f /NP f classes restricted to sets of integers. The above arguments show that
for many of them P f = NP f !. We shall use our following unpublished result which is cited in their paper as Lemma
5.8.
Lemma 9 (Welch; [11, Lemma 2.5]). If α is a clockable ordinal, then every ordinal less than the next admissible
ordinal beyond α is writable in time α + ω.
Lemma 10. Let β ≤ λ be such that β is an admissible limit of admissibles but is not interior to any gap in the
clockables (i.e., it is a limit of clockables). Then
Pβ ∩ P(N) = NPβ ∩ P(N).
Proof. Let A ∈ NPβ ∩ P(N). Let ϕe witness this: ∀n, y ϕe(n, y)↓<β and ∀n[n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∃yϕe(n, y)↓ 1]. The
Bounding Lemma shows that there is a smaller bound γ0 < β for the lengths of all these computations. Hence if
n ∈ A then there is a y witnessing this, with ϕe(n, y)↓ 1 and converging in ≤ γ0. steps. Let u ∈ Lβ ∩WO have rank
γ0. Set:
Bn = {z : ∃y(z codes a well-founded computation witnessing ϕe(n, y)↓‖u‖ 1)}.
Again ∅ 6= Bn ∈ Σ 11 (u). As above, appealing to the Kleene Basis theorem again, there are witnessing
z, y0 ∈ Lγ+0 +1 if n ∈ A (where γ
+
0 is next admissible above γ0). In other words to test for membership in A all
228 P.D. Welch / Theoretical Computer Science 394 (2008) 223–228
we have to do is search through potential NP-witnesses y in Lγ+0 +1 ∈ Lβ . But this puts A ∈ ∆
Lβ
1 ({γ0}). By our
assumption on β, by Lemma 10, γ0 is itself writable by some program ϕ f in time < γ
+
0 . Putting this together
A ∈ ∆Lβ1 , so A ∈ Pβ . 
It would be interesting to have similar results for P(R) rather than just for P(N) here.
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